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TEE Charter of the United Nations, like any national constitution
or international treaty, may be considered from a variety of viewpoints.
It is, on the one hand, a legal enactment. As such, it may be im-
partially analyzed by lawyers all over the world, quite irrespective of
their nationality. Its victorious signatories and their defeated enemies,
as well as the small band of neutral onlookers, may all study it with a
view. to understanding its meaning and to interpreting its provisions in
the light of the probable intentions of its drafters. If we assume them
to be equally well-informed, equally well-trained, equally careful in
their analyses, and gifted with equal acumen, there is no reason why
they should not all, whatever their language, race, or creed, reach the
same or at least equivalent conclusions.
On the other hand, the principles underlying the Charter and their
practical application are also historical facts. As such their origin,
their political significance, ad their ethical implications will be very
differently assessed in different parts of the world. Each state, each
region, each continent, each class of society and each individual citizen
everywhere, will view them in the light of its or his own interests,
prejudices and general philosophy. Therefore, it is to be expected that
there will be no unanimity of outlook on the institution of the United
Nations and its Charter.
Both methods of approach, the strictly juridical and the socio-po-
litical, are useful and legitimate, each for its own purpose. But even
for the jurist, who as lawyer, as consultant, or as judge may be called
upon to interpret the Charter, it is important to understand the posi-
tion taken with regard to it in lands other than his own.
The following considerations are submitted by an inhabitant of
Geneva, the seat of the late League of Nations, who has for many years
been interested and engaged in various forms of international activity.
As a citizen of neutral Switzerland, however, he can lay claim to no
other information concerning the United Nations and its Charter than
that whicth he has been able to gain from a perusal of the published
documents, supplemented by personal observations and conversations
in London last autumn and this winter.
The European viewpoint from which he considers the United Na-
tions is, therefore, that of an outsider, of a keenly interested but foreign
well-wisher of the new organization. His natural bias, in so far as his
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deliberate efforts have not sufficed to free him of it, is that of a citizen
of a small country in the heart of the Old World. It may be noted that
this country attributes its persistent independence throughout the
centuries to its peculiar Alpine situation and to the constant practice
of armed neutrality which it had not even abandoned as a member of
the League of Nations.
It is not with Switzerland, however, but with Europe as a whole
that we are here concerned.
In order fully to understand Europe's general attitude towards the
United Nations, four main facts must be considered. The first is that
the new organization for the maintenance of peace was, like the old,
born of a war which was essentially European both in its origins and
in its main battlefields. The second is that the Charter is essentially an
American document in its inspiration and in its formulation. The third
fact is that this American product of a European war was drafted
before the end of hostilities by the victorious belligerents alone, without
any consultation with either the neutrals or the defeated. The fourth
and final fact is largely the result of the three former: as the war was
won mainly through the exertions of the three major powers, of which
one was American, the second half-Asiatic, and the third maritime
and insular; as, furthermore, at the time of the drafting of the Charter,
the continent of Europe was almost completely divided between
defeated belligerents, occupied or recently liberated victors, and neu-
trals, Europe feels, if not totally excluded from the new organization,
at least very much under-represented on it and therefore much less
intimate with it than it was with the League of Nations.
This study is to be devoted to the examination of these four funda-
mental facts.
THE UNITED NATIONS AS A PRODUCT OF EUROPEAN BELLIGERENCY
Since the end of the Napoleonic wars a trend towards the establish-
ment of international institutions is discernible in European and indeed
in world history. The latter half of the nineteenth century witnessed
the multiplication of international conferences and congresses and the
creation of a variety of technical international bureaus and unions.
With the Hague Conferences about the beginning of the twventieth
century, the movement toward international institutions progressed
from the discussion and settlement of technical questions to the po-
litical sphere. It was only during and after the first World War, how-
ever, that the organization of international society into a true com-
munity for the maintenance of peace became a political issue of the
first importance.
The first World War had been essentially European in origin and in
scope, and the first League of Nations had been essentially American
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in authorship and in design. Had it not been for aggressive Austro-
German imperialism, the war would not have broken out in August
1914. And had it not been for Anglo-Saxon, particularly American,
and still more particularly for Wilsonian, idealism, the war would pre-
sumably have ended without the creation of a League of Nations.
In both these respects history was to repeat itself a generation later.
Without Italian fascism and German national socialism, war would
not have broken out in the nineteen-thirties, and without Anglo-Saxon
and particularly American, and still more particularly Rooseveltian
idealism, the second World War also would presumably have ended
without the transformation of the belligerent United Nations into an
organization for the defense of peace and security.
Twice in a lifetime suicidal Europe plunged into war. Twice in a
lifetime it escaped annihilation or serfdom by the reluctant but trium-
phant intervention of the United States. Twice in a lifetime the experi-
ence of abhorred but unavoidable military action led American states-
manship to seek relief from its repetition by the creation of an organiza-
tion for the maintenance of peace.
In view of this sequence of events, no one can deny that the League of
Nations and the United Nations were both born of European belliger-
ency. In spite of the unavoidable over-simplification of this brief
summary, that conclusion is almost axiomatic.
THE UNITED NATIONS AS A PRODUCT OF AMERICAN STATECRAFT
It is clear that the United States was the prime mover in creating the
United Nations. It was after much American preparation that, on the
invitation of America, the Dumbarton Oaks Conference met at the
American capital. It was as a result of American initiative and under
American chairmanship that the Charter was drafted on the West
Coast of America. And it was in deference to the late American Presi-
dent that the United Nations assumed its American name. Likewise
were all the allied and subordinate agencies of international cooperation
of American origin, as the recital of their birthplaces in Hot Springs,
Atlantic City, and Bretton Woods suffices to recall.
It is for three main reasons, ethical, political, and geographic, as I
see it, that it has fallen to the United States more than to any other
country to draw the pacific conclusions of two successive world wars of
European origin.
The first of these reasons is perhaps not the most apparent. But it is,
I believe, the most fundamental. Doubtless it would be absurd and
most unhistoric to see in the American people a nation of pacifists. In
the destiny of few countries has armed force been more frequently
resorted to. Even if we leave aside the early Indian wars, without which
this continent might never have become a white man's land, it cannot
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be forgotten that American independence Nas achieved and, less than a
century later, American unity saved, by military operations. The scale
of these operations, when related to the contemporary size and re-
sources of the country, was considerable. Their violence furthermore
shows that the American people when aroused lack neither the courage
to undertake nor the tenacity to carry to their bitter end, wars no less
bloody than those which have devastated the rest of the world. Nor
can it be claimed that Americans will fight only when attacked, as the
Mexican and Spanish wars suffice to show.
It cannot, on the other hand, be maintained that Americans have
ever enjoyed a monopoly of pacific sentiment and of constructive anti-
war imagination. Europe had her Emeric Cruce, her Grotius, her
Abb6 de Saint Pierre, her Kant and her Bertha von Suttner both before
and after America had her William Penn.
However, in spite of America's belligerent past and Europe's pacifist
tradition it is doubtful if there is any large country in which the hatred
of war is more deep-rooted and universal than in the United States.
The second reason for the preponderant part the United States has
taken in the organization of peace in the twentieth century is un-
doubtedly to be found in its political importance in the contemporary
world. Although this factor is too obvious to call for comment, I
wonder if it is not more fully realized in all its implications in the Old
World than in the New. The very numbers, wealth, and general en-
lightenment of the American people have given rise to internal prob-
lems of such gigantic magnitude that they tend to distract public at-
tention in the United States from international considerations. It is a
supremely important circumstance that, of the two most poverful
members of the family of nations today, the United States is both the
more powerful and the more liberal.
Geography, the third factor accounting for the American sponsorship
of the League of Nations and especially of the United Nations, has, as
I see it, operated in two distinct ways. On the one hand, being far
removed from the European birthplace of the two World Wars, the
United States was drawn into them against its will, and in spite of its
instinctive urge to remain aloof. On the other hand, its territory, being
neither invaded nor even placed under the direct threat of invasion,
seemed predestined to offer hospitality to the efforts of all organizers of
peace.
The latter result of geography is the more obvious, but the former is
perhaps the more significant. For all civilized nations war is a curs-e.
But in addition, to the Americans, who had no territorial or conunercial
advantage to gain from the defeat of the aggressor, war would appear
as an irritatingly unnecessary and possibly avoidable foreign nuisance.
In their reaction to invasion and to its threat, the Poles, the Nor-
wegians, the Dutch, the Belgians, the French, and even the British
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naturally hated the Germans, as the Greeks hated the Italians and the
Chinese the Japanese. For all these victims of aggression, the hatred
of the aggressor was naturally so acute and the national emergency so
compelling, that the mind, the soul, and the will of the attacked nations
were absorbed and exhausted in responding to both. In America, on
the other hand, while disgust and contempt for the wanton disturbers
of the peace were perhaps equally universal, there naturally remained
more freedom of reflection on the general course of events and more
room for the abhorrence not only of the war makers, but of war itself.
Moreover, as an assault on liberty itself, and therefore ultimately as a
menace to the American way of life, the aggression of autocracy pro-
voked a reaction which did not spend itself on the assailant but turned
on all those traditional institutions and circumstances which made
war possible.
Thus the United States in 1914, 1915, 1916 and again in 1939, 1940,
and 1941 launched its offensive against war itself. And this offensive
was carried through even after the United States had been obliged by
events to renounce its traditional neutrality. Is it not probable that if
America had been invaded in 1914 and in 1939, as were her later allies,
the immediate neighbors of Germany, America would not have taken
the direction of the crusade for peace as unequivocally as she did in
promoting first the League of Nations and then the United Nations?
THE UNITED NATIONS AS A PRODUCT OF THE ALLIANCE
AGAINST THE AxIs
In order to understand the origins of the United Nations as they
appear to Europeans today, one must always remember that the new
organization came into being as the result of a war which broke out in
the Old World and of a peace effort which was initiated in the New.
And'in order to understand the San Francisco Charter, one should ever
bear in mind that it was drafted exclusively by, and primarily for, the
Allies themselves, at a moment when hostilities had not yet been termi-
nated. It was therefore adopted at a time when the rest of the world,.
and particularly Europe, was divided between two execrated and
largely defeated foes, and a small band of neutrals, some of whom were
very suspect and all of whom were negligible.
The new organization was, in the words of the Moscow Declaration
of October 30, 1943, to constitute "a system of general security." At
Dumbarton Oaks it was decided on October 7, 1944, that one of its
purposes was to "develop friendly relations among nations" and "to,
strengthen universal peace." Membership in the United Nations is
furthermore, under Article 4 of the Charter of June 26, 1945, open to
all "peace-loving nations." In spite of these and several other similar
declarations which could be quoted to show the all-embracing ambitions
[Vol. 55:10361040
UNITED NATIONS FROM EUROPEAN VIE 10
of the United Nations, the fact remains that the new peace organiza-
tion, like the old, owed its foundation to victorious belligerents, but
that, unlike the old, it was founded during a war and without consulta-
tion with any others. It is therefore not surprising to see it suggested,
without apparent irony, "that the best definition of a 'peace-loving'
state is one that declared war on one or more of the Axis powers." I
This belligerent origin of the Charter explains some of its most
characteristic features. The first is that to which allusion has just been
made. It is as natural that belligerent allies, conferring together in
the course of a war, should publicly profess complete confidence in each
other, as that they should hesitate to extend such confidence to any
outside their own ranks. That is why the authors of the Charter were
bound to assume that all the United Nations were by definition "peace-
loving" and that they alone were competent to judge of the sentiments
and policies of all the other states.
The second consequence of the belligerent origin of the new organi-
zation is its hierarchic structure and the authoritarian and militant
spirit which animates the most significant provisions of its Charter.
On the field of battle there can be no equality of nations. That is
why the San Francisco Charter, though it speaks much of the "sov-
ereign equality of states," violates that principle to a degree unknown
in all previous annals of international law. It maintains and reinforces
the privileged position of the Great Powers as permanent and unelected
members of the Security Council, much as the Geneva Covenant had
done before, but it goes appreciably further in this direction in setting
up two distinct sets of rights and duties. According to the Charter,
there is one law for the strong and quite another for the weak. There is
inequality in laying down and in enforcing the law, as is indeed natural
among the most unequal members of the international community;
but there is also a complete and flagrant denial of the much more
fundamental principle of equality before the law. While the mighty
are collectively assured of almost unlimited authority over the weak,
and individually assured of almost unlimited impunity in case of vio-
lation of their pacific covenants, the latter are denied the right even
to be consulted in certain matters of peace and war which, on account
of their very weakness, may be much more vital to them than to their
stronger neighbors.
That such provisions should have been proposed by the Great
Powers, who are the real authors of the Charter, is perhaps less astonish-
ing than that they should have been concurred in by their feebler allies.
Both are to be explained solely by the belligerent composition of the
San Francisco Conference and by the fact that it met before the return
of peace.
1. GoOiucir and HAMBRO, TE CHARTER OF THE UmTED NATiONs: Con=-TrAY
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The same may be said of the rules laid down by the United Nations
to govern the conduct of the rest of mankind. Under Article 2 of the
Charter it is provided that "the Organization shall ensure that states
which are not Members of the United Nations act in accordance with"
principles affirmed by the United Nations "so far as may be necessary
for the maintenance of international peace and security." Such a rule
is, of course, incompatible with the "equal rights . . . of nations large
and small" affirmed in the Preamble of the Charter and with the
"respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of
peoples" proclaimed in Article 11, and is contrary to past international
usage in times of peace. But as neutral states have recently been
reminded to their detriment, it has often been applied in times of war.
If we refer to it here, it is to show how the new international code con-
ceived in San Francisco tends to encourage in times of peace indulgence
in imperious habits acquired by belligerents in the bitter experience of
war. This is due not solely, to be sure, to the contagious example of
those dictatorial states which the nations assembled at San Francisco
were united to defeat, but mainly 'to the fact that they were themselves
legislating for peace under the stress of the war they had not yet fully
won.
Thus, the double assertion of authority by the United Nations as a
whole over non-member states and by the Security Council over the
minor member states strikes me as an expression of the war spirit which
animated the San Francisco Conference. Such an assertion of au-
thority, it may be argued, is required for the maintenance of world
peace. Perhaps. But whereas the assumption of authority by the
victorious allies over the whole international community, and by the
Great Powers over the small, may be held to make for world order, the
refusal to grant the United Nations any true authority over the Great
Powers themselves assuredly makes for world anarchy, And that also
I regard as a symptom of the spirit prevailing at San Francisco.
In times of war, might undoubtedly takes precedence over right.
Whence the strength of the Charter as a weapon for the strong. In the
long run, however, peace can be maintained only by the subordination
of might to right. Whence its inadequacy as a shield for the weak.
When compared with the Covenant of the League of Nations, the
Charter affords the international community a much greater measure
of protection against minor disturbances. But while making far greater
demands upon the independence of the small states, it promises them
no effective security against the only real danger to which they are
exposed, namely against the possible aggressive designs of the great.
That also can be explained only by the belligerent circumstances
under which the Charter was drafted. Arrayed together in a common
victorious struggle against a common aggressor, the United Nations
were ill prepared to consider any threat other than that which had led
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to their alliance, and they were disinclined to conceive of the treason-
able possibility of any armed conflict among themselves. Moreover,
for the small states at San Francisco to have sought more effective pro-
tection against the great would have been to question the loyalty of
their leaders, inasmuch as it was understood that no other Great
Powers were to survive the struggle in which the United Nations were
collectively engaged.
The belligerent origin of the Charter also explains another of its
characteristics, namely its extreme discretion in the matter of inter-
national disarmament. After the first World War such disarmament
was looked upon both as the price to be paid for, and still more as the
great prize to be collected after, the true organization of peace. During
the final stages of the second World War such an aim was looked upon
as Utopian or even as undesirable. How could it have been otherwise
when the disarmament of "the peace-loving nations" had almost led to
their defeat at the hands of the aggressors and when, moreover, the
principal victors themselves were as uncertain about their respective
ambitions as they were conscious of their grave divergencies of outlook?
One last feature of the Charter of the United Nations should be
noted here, namely that of its relations to the Covenant of the League
of Nations. As we have seen, the Charter had a double origin. It was
born of a war which the Covenant had failed to prevent and of the
action of America which had repudiated the Covenant. It is therefore
not surprising that the San Franciscan authors of the Charter were
more inclined to deprecate the work of their Genevese predecessors
than to imitate it. However, as both documents are attempts to solve
what is essentially the same problem, as the general sentiment about
national sovereignty and international security had undergone no
fundamental change, as the Covenant was the expression of much
political wisdom, and as the experience gained by the League was not
lost upon its often well-informed but none too generous successors,
they were on many points led to display their passion for reform by
a change of vocabulary more than by any substantive revolution.
Thus the Assembly of the League became the General Assembly of the
United Nations; the old Council the new Security Council and the
Social and Economic Council; the former Permanent Court of Inter-
national Justice the International Court of Justice; so, also, a novel,
much more ambitious but perhaps less promising system of Interna-
tional Trusteeship was substituted for the discarded Mandates Sys-
tem. Was it not, at least in part, also for similar reasons that West-
chester County was preferred to Geneva?
This last change, however, also has a much deeper significance. In
1919, Geneva became the seat of the League largely thanks to Ameri-
can influence. President Wilson and the majority of the drafters of
the Covenant were of opinion that peace should be built on the founda-
1946l 1043
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
tions of justice, that impartiality was a condition of justice, and that a
neutral country offered the greatest guarantee for the impartial con-
sideration of international problems. In 1945 the prevailing atmos-
phere among the leading victors was very different. What, in the face
of the unspeakable crimes of the aggressors, was justice, if not revenge?
What, in view of the tortures endured by their victims, and of the ap-
parent indifference displayed by the neutrals, was professed impartial-
ity, if not weakness or even complacency? Why, therefore, revert to
the errors of the past and select for the preparation of a better future a
neutral rather than a belligerent site?
While Geneva was the logical choice for the seat of a pacific League,
or, better, Society of Nations, some city of the principal victorious
state was a logical choice for the seat of an organization which had
chosen to carry over into peace the very name which its founders and
sole members had glorified on the fields of battle. Furthermore, New
York is as symbolic of the New World as Geneva was of the Old. This
leads us to the consideration of our fourth and last point.
THE UNITED NATIONS AS A NON-EUROPEAN ORGANIZATION
Of the 51 states which have signed the San Francisco Charter and
thus become original members of the United Nations, 22 are situated
in the American Hemisphere, 15 in Europe, 10 in Asia and Australasia,
and 4 in Africa.
Such statistics, which taken in themselves present very little interest,
suffice to show how feebly Europe, which before the second World War
counted no less than thirty sovereign states, is represented in the new
organization. From the European viewpoint, these statistics fail,
however, to give the complete picture of this under-representation.
Of the fifteen European states whose delegates sit in the General
Assembly, three belong to the Soviet Union and at least three others to
countries which are hardly in a position to pursue a foreign policy inde-
pendent of Moscow. That leaves nine European states, including
Greece and Turkey, which partake of that civilization which is com-
monly called Western. Of these nine, all but two, having been overrun
and occupied by the enemy in the course of the war were, in the pre-
paratory stages of the Charter, represented by governments-in-exile.
Of those two, one is Turkey and the other the United Kingdom. The
former is considerably more than half Asiatic, and the other is not a
part of continental Europe. Moreover, as the metropolis of a far-flung
empire, Great Britain has interests in all parts of the world and can
therefore not be regarded as a purely European state.
The conclusion suggested by this brief review is obvious. Europe
was almost totally absent from the councils of the Great Powers which
laid the foundations of the United Nations. At San Francisco, Europe
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was only very partially represented by a limited number of govern-
ments whose international authority was seriously impaired by the
uncertain hold they had on their own only recently liberated peoples.
Even today Europe, once the proud master and creditor of the civilized
world, is reduced to the humble position of a prostrate, self-mutilated
and heavily indebted servant. Such is the price of the twIVo World Wars
of which she was the responsible author, the main theatre, and the
principal victim:
No wonder, then, that over half of Europe is alien to the United
Nations and that even those European states which have been admitted
to the temple of peace erected by others than themselves find it hard to
feel truly at home within its unfinished and none too hospitable walls.
It would be an error, however, to deduce that Europe, because
largely alien to and excluded from the United Nations, harbors any
hostile sentiments toward its founders and its members or anything
but the most friendly interest in its aims and purposes. Almost all the
states which have not yet been invited or even allowed to sign the
Charter are anxious to do so without delay and without reservations.
For all the defeated states it would be an impatiently awaited rehabili-
tation. For the neutrals it would be a liberation from their moral and
political isolation and a most welcome opportunity to join in a collective
effort for the reconstruction of Europe and for the reestablishment of
normal relations of confident cooperation with the rest of civilized
mankind.
This general willingness and well-nigh universal desire to adhere to
the Charter does not indicate that its provisions meet with equal ap-
proval everywhere. It would, I believe, be nearer the truth to say that
the nations of Europe aspire to join the United Nations in spite of the
Charter rather than because of it. It is the desire to create new po-
litical bonds of cooperation and, for the defeated, to sever or loosen old
bonds of hostility and vassalage, that impels Europe to seek admission
to the international organization.
The Charter itself, in so far as there can be said to be any opinion
on the subject, is generally held to be inferior to the Covenant in that
it makes far greater demands on the independence of member states
while promising them far less security.
'In order to understand this statement, one must remember that the
European viewpoint on the Charter is necessarily that of the small
states which constitute the Old World today, and that the new organi-
zation, while a legal paradise for the Great Powers, seems to be a legal
jail for the minor countries.
One of the features which clearly distinguishes the United Nations
from the League is that it is founded on the principles of coercion rather
than those of persuasion and emulation. Another, as we have seen, is
that in spite of the repeated references in the Charter to the "sovereign
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equality" of its signatories, it in reality creates two entirely different
classes of members: a minority of five Great Powers who have the right
to command but not the duty to obey, and a majority of small states
who are legally bound to carry out the instructions of the Security
Council, over which they can have but a very limited influence. With-
out attempting here fully to substantiate this view, which is hardly
debatable, I shall be content to quote the three following most signifi-
cant provisions of the Charter:
Article 24, Paragraph 1, reads:
"In order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United Na-
tions, its Members confer on the Security Council primary responsi-
bility f~r the maintenance of international peace and security, and
agree that in carrying out its duties under this responsibility the Se-
curity Council acts on their behalf."
Article 25 reads:
"The Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out
the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present
Charter."
Articles 24 and 25 achieve the complete subordination of the small
states to the Security Council. The five permanent members, on the
other hand, are insured complete independence by the first sentence of
Paragraph 3 of Article 27:
"Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters [other than
procedural] shall be made by an affirmative vote of seven members,
including the concurring votes of the permanent members ..
All these provisions expressly create an unequivocal duty to obey
the orders of the Security Council, a duty, that is, of all states except
the Five Great Powers, whose right of veto confers upon each of them
exceptional influence over the Security Council and an equally excep-
tional independence of it.
If and when unanimous, these Powers are practically the masters of
the Security Council and thereby of the United Nations, since with
the concurrence of two small states they may dictate its policy. If and
when they are not unanimous, on the other hand, the Security Council
and therefore the United Nations are powerless as agents for the en-
forcement of peace.
Inasmuch as the only real danger to the peace of the world is a war
willed or approved by at least one Great Power, the security promised
the signatories of the Charter is as precarious and illusory, as are direct
and far-reaching the inroads it entails on their national sovereignty
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In fact, the freedom of all the small states is contingent upon the dis-
unity of the great, whereas their security is equally contingent upon
the unity of the Great Powers.
As a means of reconciling national freedom and international se-
curity-the supreme problem of world politics-the Charter therefore
can hardly be hailed as a promising Gospel of salvation. It possesses,
however, one great superiority over the Covenant, namely that it has
proved acceptable to the American Senate. This practical superiority,
which may at least in part be due to its theoretical inferiority, is such
that it has changed the whole aspect of the political world.
The League of Nations, whose members were bound together by the
ties of a Covenant which demanded less sacrifice of national sov-
ereignty of its minor signatories and which promised greater security
to all, proved impotent largely because of the abstention of the United
States. The United Nations, assured of the support of all the Great
Powers, thanks to the right of veto which its Charter had granted them,
is today the great and almost the sole hope of humanity. It is for that
reason that Europeans, well-nigh unanimous in criticizing its constitu-
tion, are well-nigh unanimous also in seeking admission to its ranks.
CONCLUSION
Having from a European viewpoint cast a glance at the origin and
present status of the United Nations, I feel impelled in a final word to
consider the future of the new organization.
We have seen that, although this organization was born of a war that
originated on the continent of Europe, the states of the Old World had
had very little to do with its construction. We have seen also that even
today the continent of Europe is greatly under-represented in the
United Nations. I do not believe this state of affairs wll continue
indefinitely. Europe is anxious to become a full member of the new
organization and is prepared, for that purpose, to overcome or at least
temporarily to overlook the misgivings inspired by certain features of
the Charter. If the United Nations is to succeed in the efforts, initiated
on the fields of battle and laboriously pursued since in the sphere of
diplomacy, to establish, maintain and consolidate peace, the active
cooperation of Europe would seem indispensable. This is so, not in
spite of the fact that that benighted continent has been a hotbed of
wars in the past, but for that very reason. The defeat of the guilty
aggressors and the occupation by the victors of their conquered terri-
tory was and is a necessary condition for the restoration of peace. But
surely they cannot be looked upon as a sufficient condition for the
maintenance of peace. As for the neutrals, their exclusion from the
ranks of the United Nations was no less logical than was that of the
defeated foes during the period of belligerency, and it will remain so
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until the treaties that are to put an end to the present state of war
come into force.
Once peace has been made, however, the continued exclusion of any
truly peace-loving nation from the ranks of those who have set them-
selves the task of protecting mankind against a renewal of the horrors
of war would surely appear unjustified in its motives and unfortunate
in its consequences.
The most ardent peace-loving citizens of the world, within as without
the United Nations, are all equally critical of certain fundamental
characteristics of its Charter. But all are convinced that even if im-
perfect, this Charter is certainly better than none, and that they must
exert all their efforts towards improvement, enlargement and reform
of the new organization.
